Visual analytics for networked-guarantee loans risk management by Niu, Zhibin et al.
Visual analytics for loan guarantee network risk management
Dawei Cheng*
Shanghai Jiao tong University
Zhibin Niu†
Tianjin University
Junchi Yan‡
IBM research – China
Jiawan Zhang§
Tianjin University
Liqing Zhang¶
Shanghai Jiao tong University
ABSTRACT
Groups of enterprises guarantee each other and form complex guar-
antee networks when they try to obtain loans from banks. Such
secured loan can enhance the solvency and promote the rapid growth
in the economic upturn period. However, potential systemic risk
may happen within the risk binding community. Especially, during
the economic down period, the crisis may spread in the guarantee
network like a domino. Monitoring the financial status, preventing
or reducing systematic risk when crisis happens is highly concerned
by the regulatory commission and banks. We propose visual ana-
lytics approach for loan guarantee network risk management, and
consolidate the five analysis tasks with financial experts: i) visual an-
alytics for enterprises default risk, whereby a hybrid representation
is devised to predict the default risk and developed an interface to
visualize key indicators; ii) visual analytics for high default groups,
whereby a community detection based interactive approach is pre-
sented; iii) visual analytics for high defaults pattern, whereby a motif
detection based interactive approach is described, and we adopt a
Shneiderman Mantra strategy to reduce the computation complexity.
iv) visual analytics for evolving guarantee network, whereby anima-
tion is used to help understanding the guarantee dynamic; v) visual
analytics approach and interface for default diffusion path. The tem-
poral diffusion path analysis can be useful for the government and
bank to monitor the default spread status. It also provides insight
for taking precautionary measures to prevent and dissolve systemic
financial risk. We implement the system with case studies on a real-
world guarantee network. Two financial experts are consulted with
endorsement on the developed tool. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first visual analytics tool to explore the guarantee network
risks in a systematic manner.
Index Terms: Computer Applications [J]: Financial—I.3.6 COM-
PUTER GRAPHICS Interaction techniques
1 INTRODUCTION
Financial safety is a main concern of the government and banks. The
majority of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are difficult to get
loan from the banks for their limited credit qualification, thus they
often need to seek loan guarantees. In fact, guaranteed loan is already
an important way to raise money in addition with seeking listed. In
some developed economy like in US and UK, special government
backed banks are established to provide guarantee credit [22, 27, 30,
40,55]; While in emerging economies like Korea [19] and China [31],
it is more common that the corporations guarantee each other when
they are trying to secure loans from lending institutions. It is reported
that a quarter of the $13 trillion in total outstanding loans in China
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Figure 1: A real-world loan guarantee network formed from bank
records, with each node as an enterprise.
are guaranteed loans in 2014 [40] and there is an 18% year-to-year
increase [36]. This has led to a noticeable new phenomenon: a large
amount of corporations back each other and form complex guarantee
networks.
Appropriate guarantee union may reduce the default risk but
contagious damages over the networked enterprises may happen
in practice. With the economic down period, large – scale breach
of contract would hazard the banking asset quality deteriorated
seriously and cause systematic crisis. Although the loan guarantee
network appeared for less than twenty years and it is still not well
understood. The current financial academic community published
some qualitative analysis works on small guarantee networks and
there is few quantitative analysis research. In banking industry,
the credit assessors evaluate an enterprise basically on the basis of
classic credit rating approach. Such a approach is not well suited for
the complex benefit relationships. The risk management for the loan
guarantee network is challenging:
Firstly, the loan guarantee network may consist of thousands of
enterprises with complex guarantee relationships and intertwined
risk factors, making it very difficult to analysis. Fig. 1 illustrates a
real guarantee network we constructed using ten years of bank loan
records and it consists of more than 1000 enterprises, each of which
has more than 3000 financial entries. Monitoring the financial status
is so difficult that usually only after capital chain rupture, can the
regulators study the case in-depth.
Secondly, the fact that small and medium enterprise business oper-
ations (for example, the loan officers do not access to the enterprise
net assets information) have inadequate transparency makes the loan
risk evaluation more difficult. Some borrowers fraudulently obtain
loans using the faultiness of bank lending risk managements. The
cognition to risk loan guarantee especially malicious guarantee is
still relatively limited.
Thirdly, thousands of guarantee networks of different complex-
ities coexist for a long period and evolve over time, this requires
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adaptive strategy to prevent, identification and dismantling system-
atic crisis. In the complex background of the growth period, the
structural adjustment of the pain period and the early stage of the
stimulus period, the structural and deep-level contradictions emerged
in the economic development, all kinds of risk factors along the guar-
antee network accelerate the risk transmission and amplification, the
guarantee network may be alienated from “mutual aid group” as
“breach of contract”.
In this paper, we propose visual analytics approach for loan guar-
antee network risk management. It includes visual analytics for
i) enterprises default risk; ii) high default groups; iii) high default
pattern; iv) evolving guarantee network; and v) default diffusion
path. In a nutshell, the main contributions are:
1. We consolidate with financial experts and identify five key re-
search problems for loan guarantee network risk management,
which is driven by emerging finance industry demands, and
we believe this is an important research problem to the visual
analytics science and technology community;
2. We propose intuitive visual analytics approaches for the tasks
of i) enterprises default risk; ii) high default groups; iii) high
default pattern; iv) evolving guarantee network; and v) default
diffusion path.
3. We construct real loan guarantee network and perform empir-
ical study on ten years of bank loan records. We highlight
three high default patterns which are difficult to be discovered
without visual analytic approach. We conduct interviews with
two banking loan experts and got endorsed.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: Section 2 de-
scribes works involving different aspects related to our problem;
Section 3 details the five visual analytic tasks and our approaches;
Section 4 describe the data, case study; and we report user study
results in Section 5. Conclusions and future works are described in
Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
To our best knowledge, this is the first work of visual analysis for
the loan guarantee network risk management. We thus introduce
several relevant work on network analytics in the financial domain;
anomalous and significant subgraph detection in attributed networks;
and works on financial security visualization.
Credit risk evaluation Consumer credit risk evaluation is of-
ten technically addressed in a data-driven fashion and has been
extensively investigated [5, 24]. Since the seminal “Partial Credit”
model [39], numerous statistical approaches are introduced for credit
scoring, including logistic regression [60], k-NN [26], neural net-
work [18], support vector machine [28]. More recently, [4] presents
an in-depth analysis on how to interpret and visualize the learned
knowledge embedded in the neural networks using explanatory rules.
The authors in [32] combine debt-to-income ratio with consumer
banking transactions, and use a linear regression model with time-
windowed data set to predict the default rates in a short future. They
claim a 85% default prediction accuracy and can save cost between
6% and 25%.
Financial network analytics Financial crises and systemic risk
have always been a major concern [9, 21]. Networks or graph is a
natural representation of the financial systems as they often bear com-
plex interdependence and connections inside [2]. The relationship
between network structure and financial system risk are carefully
studied and several insights have been drawn: network structure has
few impact for system welfare but plays an important role in deter-
mining systemic risk and welfare in short-term debt [3]. After the
2008 global financial crisis, network theory attracts more attention:
the crisis brought by Lehman Brothers spreads on connected corpo-
rations in a similar infectious way as the epidemic of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002 – both are small damage that
hits a networked system and causes serious events [8, 13]. The jour-
nal of Nature Physics organizes a special on how to understand some
fundamental economic issues using network theory [1]. These publi-
cations suggest the applicability of network based financial model.
For example, the dynamic network produced by bank overnight
funds loan may be an alert of the crisis [13]. Contrary to the con-
ventional stereotype that large institutions are “too big to fail”, the
truth is the position of the institution in the network is equally and
sometimes more important than its size [6]. More central the vertex
is to the graph, more influential it is to the whole economic network
when default occurs [13]. Moreover, the research that aims to under-
stand individual behavior and interactions in the social network, has
also attracted extensive attention [7, 20, 46, 47, 61, 62, 67]. Although
preliminary efforts have been made using network theory to under-
stand fundamental problems in financial systems [12,17,64], there is
little work on the system risk analysis in the loan guarantee network
except for the preliminary work [41]. Among them, may be the most
important work is using K-shell decomposition to predict the default
rate; positive correlation between the K-Shell decomposition value
of the network and default rates was reported [41].
Anomalous and significant subgraph detection in network
Anomalous and significant subgraphs have been applied in many
domains such as societal events in social media, new business dis-
covery, auction fraud, fake reviews, email spams, false advertis-
ing [42, 54]. Classic anomalous and significant subgraphs refer to
subgraphs, in which the behaviors (attributes) of the nodes or edges
are significantly different from the behaviors of those outside the
subgraphs [48]. Anomalous and significant subgraphs in social net-
work can be used for early detection of emerging events such as
civil unrest prediction, rare disease outbreak detection, and early
detection of human rights events. The heterogeneous social network
is modeled as a sensor network in which each node senses its local
neighborhood, computes multiple features, and reports the overall
degree of anomalousness. P-values of the subgraphs are used to
represent the significance, and iterative subgraph expansion are used
for the scaling problem [15]. Emerging events such as crimes or dis-
ease cases are detected from Spatial Networks [34, 44]. A common
challenge for the subgraph detection is the complexity. As many
of the algorithms are turned into subgraph isomorphism problem
which is N-P complete problem, it is computationally infeasible for
naive search. Algorithms are designed to optimize the performance.
Readers are referred to [43, 58, 59, 68] for more details.
Visualization in financial systems Financial risk is a major con-
cern of the government and the banks. Visual analysis can enhance
the understanding and communication of risk, help to analysis risks
and prevent systemic risks. This is done by developing interpretable
models, and and couple them with visual, interactive interfaces.
In modern banking industry the business becomes more and more
complex, the risk assessment and risk loan pattern detection have
attracted a major concern. Animation is used to visually analysis
large amounts of time-dependent data [63]. In [29], 3D tree map
are introduced to monitor the real-time stock market performance
and to identify a particular stock that produced an unusual trading
patterns. Interactive exploratory tool is designed to help the casual
decision-maker quickly choose between various financial portfo-
lios [50]. Coordinated specific keywords visualization within wire
transactions are used to detect suspicious behaviors [14]. The Self-
Organizing Map (SOM), a neural network based visualization tool
is often used in financial risk visualization analysis, for monitoring
the sovereign defaults occurrence in less developed countries [52],
visual analysis of the evolution of currency crises by comparing the
clusters of crises between decades [51], and discovering imbalances
in financial networks [53]. Self-Organizing Time Map (SOTM)
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Figure 2: Overview of the system and tasks.
are used to decompose and identify temporal structural changes in
macro financial data around the global financial crisis in 2007 and
2009. Readers are referred to [37] for more references on financial
visualization.
3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND VISUALIZATION
We consult with financial experts and consolidate five analysis tasks.
In this section, we give an brief introduction in the first place before
describing detailed algorithm, strategy and interactions. Fig. 2 gives
the overview of the system and tasks. We first construct the real loan
guarantee networks from bank record, perform statistical analysis
and employ machine learning based approach to predicate enterprise
default risk. All these data are fit into the interface to finish the tasks
proposed by financial experts. Specifically, the tasks include:
T1: Visual Analytics for Enterprise Default Risk. The current
internal loan credit rating system is based on the pure financial
status of the individual borrower. Credit assessor can usually
access to the first layer of guarantee chain, and could not
trustfully evaluate the entire guarantee network. In order to
avoid inadequate risk assessment, it is necessary to carry out a
systematic analysis of the enterprise.
T2: Visual Analytics for High Default Group. Identifying the
high default groups helps the banking experts single out and
tackle the principal default problem. Visual analytics tools
should be developed for thoroughly analyzing of the network,
and recognize high defaults enterprises.
T3: Visual Analytics for High Default Pattern. Some known
guarantee patterns may lead to default and diffusion, but there
may exist more complex patterns which is difficult to be dis-
covered. This task requires visualize the known risk guarantee
pattern and able to explore other more complex risk guarantee
patterns.
T4: Visual Analytics for Evolving Guarantee Network. Like
many other real networks, there are competitive decision mak-
ing taking place in the guarantee network. Understanding the
network dynamic helps financial experts understand how the
firms are connected together temporally. This task requires
visualizing the guarantee network evolution based on history
data.
T5: Visual Analytics for Default Propagation Path. Before the
crisis, forecasting the default diffusion path and monitoring
the default spread status helps the government and bank take
precautionary measures, conduct research, and take effective
measures to prevent and dissolve risks, such that no regional
or systemic financial risk occur.
3.1 Visual Analytics for Enterprise Default Risk
Default risk predication The loan records reveal that the guaran-
tee network and default rates are both increasing, and the network
structures show strong correlation with the defaults. We construct
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Figure 3: Illustration for the rolling sliding windows protocol. Features
are extracted in the training window, and the corresponding outcome
default label is collected in the observation window. Then the features
and default outcome are used to train the model. The trained model is
used by collecting the input features during the prediction window, and
verify its performance when we reach the end of evaluation window.
feature vector consisting of hybrid information and employ super-
vised learning approach to train the prediction model. In what
follows, we discuss the hybrid features used in our model.
In order to build a highly representative feature which can reliably
reflect the statistical relationships between the customers informa-
tion and their repayment ability, we clean the data and construct
the features as: Basic Profile, the essential company registration
information, which reflects the character, capital, collateral, capabil-
ity, condition and stability [41]. We use business nature, registered
capital, enterprise scale, employee number and others as corpora-
tion’s basic profile. Most banks require company to update the basic
information when the enterprise makes a loan application, and we
choose to use the latest information as the basic profile features of
the loan. Credit Behavior, historical behavior e.g. credit history,
default records, default amount, total loan amount and loan count,
total loan frequency (if any), total default rates. They are calculated
by all the loan records before the active loan contract. Active Loan,
the loan contract in its execution period. It contains active loan
amount, active loan times, type of capital return and interest return
etc. Network Structure, network features such as centralities are
extracted as NS. Note that as discussed above, the basic profile may
be not completely trustworthy as the SMEs may provide out of date
or even fake information to the bank. However, the guarantee net-
work is trustable information as the bank can build it from its own
record systems.
The prediction of default for a customer’s loan guarantee can
be modeled as a supervised learning problem. We use logistic
regression based on gradient boosting tree [23] for the predication.
The tree ensemble model using K additive function to prediction
output can be represented as:
yˆi =
K
∑
k=1
fk(Xi) (1)
In Eq. 1, fk is the kth decision tree, Xi is the training feature and yˆi
is predication results.Finding parameters of the tree model is turned
into minimize the objective function problem and it can be trained
in an additive manner [16].
L(φ) =∑
i
l(yˆi,yi)+∑
k
Ω( fk) (2)
where
Ω( f ) = γT +
1
2
λ ||ω||2 (3)
where ∑i l(yˆi,yi) is a training loss function measures the difference
between the prediction and the target; Ω( f ) is a smoothing regular-
ization term to avoid over fitting.
Specifically, we use three-month window for training, observation,
predication, and evaluation. As Fig. 3 shows, in the training stage,
for all customers who obtain bank loans from 2013 Q1(first quarter
Figure 4: The interface for Visual Analytics for Enterprise Default Risk.
We use a heatmap to code the rolling prediction risks over month.
(a)  (b)  (c)  
Figure 5: Visualization of the network with (a) the rolling prediction
risk, (b) K-Shell value and (c) Authority score.
of 2013), the features are extracted in that period, and the repayment
status in 2013 Q2 are the labels to train the model. In the testing
stage, we use the trained model to predict the customers who obtain
loans between 2013 Q2 and use the real repayment status from 2013
Q3 to evaluate the performance when reaching the end of September
2013. The reasons for such a sliding window setting are two-folds:
1. Prediction shall be adapted to a dynamic setting with a regu-
larly updated forecasting results. In fact, using sliding window
is a typical way for rolling prediction as commonly adopted in
event prediction practices such as [65, 66].
2. The business often runs on a quarterly basis. Thus from a
business demand perspective, it would be helpful to know the
borrowers who may be default on a quarterly basis.
Default risk visualization. We design and implemented visual
interface enable to view the network with various multiple mea-
surements. Fig. 4 gives the interface, by which users can adjust
the node size by the predicted default risk and by the following
network centrality measurements: Hub score and Authority score,
K-Shell decomposition score, PageRank, Eigenvector Centrality
Scores, Betweenness centrality, Closeness centrality. Fig. 5 gives
a part visualization of a real guarantee network. In the graph, all
defaulted enterprises are highlighted by red circles. Node size pro-
portional to predicted risk (a), K-shell value (b), and authority score
(c). Through the interface, users can also observe the rolling predic-
tion risk of an enterprise over month and highlight it on the whole
network by choosing it on the heatmap.
3.2 Visual Analytics for High Default Groups
Recognizing high default groups narrow down the risk guarantee
relationship search scope and enable financial experts focus on firms
with high-default crowd. Usually, community detection divides
the guarantee network into groups (communities) based on how
the nodes are connected together. Theoretically, community struc-
ture in graph is defined as the node set internally interacts with
each other more frequently than with those outside it. Identifying
such sub-structures provides insight into understanding the struc-
ture of complex networks (both functions and topology affect each
other) [57].
Based on the conjecture that defaults occur in clusters, we first
divide the whole network into several disjoint sets by community
Figure 6: Defaults occur in clusters and we interactive edit the clusters.
(a) 30 communities generated by random random walks algorithm; (b)
10 communities after interactive editing. The ratio for default firms are
labeled on the left side treemaps separately.
detection. Fig. 6 (a) shows the results on a typical independent sub-
graph we constructed from the bank loan records. The communities
are marked using separate color background and average default
rates are labeled. There are 30 communities, but the default occurs
on four of them with average 38% to 8.6% defaults rates, all other
9 communities have no default during the guarantee network exis-
tence. Similar phenomenon are observed on random walks, edge
betweenness, and spinglass community. In practice, we first use
random walk algorithm [45, 49] to divide the whole guarantee net-
works into groups. We use a revised treemap interface to visualize
the community detection results. The community label and default
rates are displayed on the flat colored blocks.The treemap chart used
for navigation here, thus the sum of area does not necessarily to be
one. The larger blocks reveal the high default communities saliently.
However, the evaluation of community detection is still an open
question [35], and the community detection algorithm only con-
siders the link information and neglect node attribute information,
the partition may not be consonant to the actual conditions. The
basic rule for community detection is to minimize the number of
links between communities and this uses pure network structure
information. In financial practice, each node in the network comes
with rich information such as enterprise sectors, changes in deposits,
assets, loan amount, etc,. It would be unreliable discarding such
attributes when dividing the network. By interaction, we enable
the users to edit the communities into coherent ones by referring to
relevant financial matric. We allow users to interactively perform
the following manipulation actions.
Interactive community editing. We enable users to explore the
(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) Structural hole spanner illustration example, reproduced
from [25]; the structural hole spanners are editable for merge or
reassign actions. (b) Example to merge two communities on the
structural hole spanner.
financial information and interactively edit the communities by merg-
ing strong associated communities, reassign the community labels
for the structural hole spanners, a key role in the information diffu-
sion [11] or split a community into several disjoin smaller groups.
The generated subgraph are noted as group of interest (GOI), the
high risk guarantee pattern are often hidden in the GOI.
Reassign. The reassign operation allow to the change the com-
munity labels of the structure hole spanner. Structure hole spanner
is the bridge node which connect different communities in a net-
work. Fig. 7 is reproduced from [25], and it illustrates a network
with three communities and six structural hole spanners. Empirical
study suggests that individuals would benefit from filling the “holes”
(called as structural hole spanners) between people or groups that
are otherwise disconnected [10]. Principled methodology to detect
structural hole spanners from a given social network are still not
clear [38]. In fact, we observed high default on structure hole span-
ners with their neighbouring internal nodes. We enable the users can
investigate the financial matric and reassign the community labels of
the structure hole spanners. Specially, when the user wish to merge
two adjacent communities, he/she firstly double clicks one block on
the tree map, all the other connected commonties are highlighted.
Single clicking the structure hole spanner node can reassign it into
the opposite community. For example, when community C1 and C2
are chosen, single click node a, both communities will be merged as
C1, and vice versa.
Merge. Neighbouring communities can be merged. As the
community detection divides a graph purely based on links in the
graph, algorithm may generate too many communities where some
of them share common sector category or similar network structures.
Merging the communities referring the financial matric can produce
medium size and more tractable subgraphs. Specifically, when the
user wish to merge two adjacent communities; he firstly double click
one “tile” on the tree map, all other the connected commonties are
highlighted. Double click the structure hole spanner node can merge
the two commonties together and labeled as the clicked community.
Split. Sometimes, we need to split the community into several
parts. This happen when there exists when the default unevenly
distributed. We can cut off the stable parts and this may reduce the
MOI computation complexity. Specifically, when the user wish to
split the community; he firstly double click one “tile” on the tree
map, all other the connected commonties are highlighted. Double
click the edge, the two opposite parts of the subgraph will be split
into two communities.
Financial information is useful. We use a financial radar chart to
encode the key financial status under the tree map. Specially, the key
indices include: Defaults, historic default behavior; LA/RC the
ratio of loan amount to registered capital. It would more insightful
using the ratio of loan amount to enterprise net assets, however, as the
latter one is not always available. We use registered capital instead.
Deposit loss the percentage of deposit loosing. The shorting of
money and rapid decrease of deposit should not be ignored. Sector
the enterprise sector is also important clue when editing communities.
GA/RC the ratio of guarantee amounts to registered capital. As
the loan guarantee is an obligation of a borrower if that borrower
A
B C
Guarantor
Borrower Borrower
A B
A
B C
A
B C C
A
B C C
(a)
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
(f)
Figure 8: (a) guarantee network, where enterprise A (guarantor)
guarantees B and C (borrower) to get loan from the bank (lender).
The (b–e) graphs are classic loan guarantee patterns. Specially, (b)
mutual loan guarantee, (c) revolving loan guarantee, (d) star shape
guarantee loan (e) joint liability loan. (f) revolving loan guarantees
detected from a real-world loan guarantee network.
defaults, the ratio of guarantee amount to enterprise net assets is a
crucial factor for the financial systematic stability. Similarly, we use
registered capital instead. Credit rating it is the review rating of
bank expert, which is also a key clue when editing communities.
3.3 Visual Analytics for High Default Pattern
Usually, high default pattern discovery is not possible by observation
as a practical loan guarantee network may consist of several tens of
thousands nodes; nor does it via algorithms – naive subgraph mining
from the network led to isomorphism problem which is proved to be
NP-complete problem. We adopt a Shneiderman Mantra strategy to
reduce the computation complexity.
Guarantee circle visualization. The small and medium firms im-
prove their borrowing capacity by a third party guarantor. Empirical
studies by bank risk control specialist suggest the guarantee circle
is a source of default risk. The most frequently used guarantee
circle patterns include mutual guarantee, joint liability guarantee,
star shape guarantee loan,and revolving guarantee (see Fig. 8). Such
interactions are legal in China currently. They can enhance the
solvency level to some extent but may induce occurrence of risks
and transmission of risk pointed by financial regulatory documents.
Often the specialists in the bank risk control department have only
SQL query capability to find relative simple guarantee pattern. In
this work, we enable automatically guarantee circle detection and
visualization – the common recognized risk loan patterns including
mutual guarantee, co-guarantee, and revolving guarantee are high-
lighted on the network. Fig. 9 gives an example of revolving loan
guarantee detected from a real-world loan guarantee network. Users
are able to focus on the relevant firms and explore more details.
Besides, there are five firms default among the eleven firms in the
three revolving structure, informing the banking experts to pay more
attention on the firms involved in such patterns.
New risk pattern discovery. As mentioned above, guarantee cir-
cles are relatively clearly understood by banking experts. However,
they still can not quite understand does there exist more complicated
guarantee patterns that may have implicit connections with high
default phenomenon. We develop a visual analytics tool to help the
experts discover and understand what have happened. The task is
challenging: arbitrary guarantee pattern which has high default rate
can be underneath the complex network structures. It is impossible
to exhaustively compare all network patterns to determine whether
it is in high default.
Based on the conjecture that defaults occur in clusters, we propose
an interactive Shneiderman Mantra strategy [56] to narrow down the
risk guarantee pattern searching space. Fig. 2 gives the processing
flow. Because the GOI are groups with high default rates, there
may exist guarantee patterns which are prone to default. Usually,
the motifs are the most basic building blocks for a network and
the number of structures are limited. Motifs may reflect functional
properties and provide a deep insight into the networks. A complex
guarantee network is always connected by several smaller subgraphs
bridged by the structural hole spanners. The sub-graphs inside the
communities may reveal certain risk even fraud pattern. In this work,
we obtain a set of motifs by first detecting motifs from the GOI. The
motifs are ranked by their default rates (Eq. (4)). Among them, high
default rate motifs are noted as pattern of interest (POI) and they
may need be investigated by banking experts in priority.
priority = (
∑de f ault node number(m))
∑node number(m)
) (4)
where m is a motif. All motifs are possible risk loan guarantee
patterns.
However, it is still computationally challenging to obtain all POIs
by the approach above for the following reasons. Firstly, motif
structures increases with the node number increase rapidly, for ex-
ample, 4 node motif has over 3000 possibilities. It is impossible to
enumerate all motif structures. Secondly, motif matching is exhaus-
tively searched from the query graph into the large network, and it
is essences subgraph isomorphism problem. It still takes too much
time for motifs with more nodes to be matched on the network. In
this work, we propose an interactive motif editing approach. Users
can further explore the financial information of adjacent nodes and
add them to the motifs and generate POI.
3.4 Visual Analytics for Evolving Guarantee Network
Network evolution over time is observed from the guarantee net-
work. The topology of the network keeps changing – some nodes
are connected to the network or removed from it, some communities
are connected together through the guarantee of the structural hole
spanner. Like many other real networks, there are competitive deci-
sion making taking place in the guarantee network: when a firm lack
security to obtain a loan from the bank, it may resort to a guarantee
corporation or thirty party firms. To some extent, the new guarantors
may improve the overall system rationality but also may induce
unstable factor as the network becomes even more complex. Under-
standing the network dynamic helps to financial experts understand
how the firms are connected together temporal. In this work, we use
animation to visualize the evolving of guarantee network. Users can
drag the time bar to backtrack how the network evolve over time.
They are allowed to hover mouse cursor over the node to view the
company’s financial information. This will help the financial experts
understand what has happened historically. Fig. 10 gives an example
how a real network evolve from July 2013 to April 2014. Combining
enterprises financial status of different time, financial experts would
be able to make analysis.
3.5 Visual Analytics for Default Propagation Path
Financial systematic risks is a top concern for the government and
banks, however, as a new phenomenon, the understanding to the
systematic risk of the loan guarantee network is still not sufficient.
Sophisticated guarantee relationships tend to cause credit granted by
multiple lenders and excessive credit. In the loan guarantee, a guar-
antor has the debt obligation if the borrower defaults, if the guarantee
could not payback to the back, it may resort to its guarantors. In this
case, the default may propagate like virus.The default contagious
increases the possibility of occurrence of risks and transmission of
risks. Especially in the economic downturn, some enterprises face
operation difficulties and the financial crisis will have a domino
effect: the default phenomenon may spread rapidly in the network,
and this will make a large number of enterprises fall into unfavorable
situation. The government and the banks always wish to monitor the
Figure 9: Visual analytics interface for evolving loan guarantees. The
numbers in the graph are node ID
Figure 10: Guarantee network keeps evolving from July 2013 to April
2014. The numbers in the graph are node ID
default spread status and understand the complexity of the current
issue of risks before they can take precautionary measures, conduct
research, and take effective measures to prevent and dissolve risks,
to ensure that no regional or systemic financial risk occur.
Based on the relevant knowledge and experience, we develop the
visual analytics tool to aid the default path discovery by visualization.
A principle of the default diffusion can be described as the vulnerable
nodes are the guarantors. Fig. 11 gives a diffusion path illustration.
(a) is a guarantee network with eight nodes, where node E provides
guarantee to five adjacent nodes and C, D provide guarantee to B
and then to A; (b) is the possible diffusion path, the default of node
A may lead to the B, C, D even E default. It is noted that node G, F,
H are not connected with node E, as the default of E will not affect
the repayment status of G,F, and H.
E
C
D
B AF
G
H
E
C
D
B AF
G
H
(a) Loan guarantee network (b) Possible default diffusion path 
Figure 11: Default path for a real network. The characters represent
different enterprises.
Figure 12: One real diffusion path and the corresponding sankey diagram.
In practice, there may be multiple possible propagation path as
each node can serve as guarantor or get guaranteed. It is difficult
to outline the main propagation path from the entire. We make the
following assumption: the node on multiple propagation pathes is
the key to prevent large scale default diffusion and thus should be
highlighted. We compute all the propagation pathes, count occur-
rences and highlight the node on the network. We use the color to
illustrate the propagation risk importance.
We design the visual analytics tool which enables financial ex-
perts take into account of several factors on the judgment of defaults.
The factors include the financial information of the corporation and
guarantee contract amount information. The former information is
plain listed when the user hovers the mouse pointer on the node,
while a sankey diagram is used to represent the guarantee flow. The
widths of the sankey diagram bands are directly proportional to
the guarantee amount. Fig. 12 (a) gives results on a real guaran-
tee network, when we choose one node, for example, node 32, the
whole potential propagation path is highlighted in (b), and (c) is
the corresponding sankey diagram. It can be seen that upstream
companies usually provides more guarantee than they received. For
example, node 18 provides much more guarantee than it receives.
The imbalance of guarantee amount and collateral amount provide
clue for the credit line assessment. The real situation is even much
more complex. The default may be diffused like a virus infection
and the virion must identify and bind to its receptor (guarantor). As
mentioned earlier, each enterprises has more than 3000 financial
entries, it is difficult to quantify anti-infective ability for each enter-
prises. We enable users to look up multiple financial status and cut
off the propagation path. We also note that the propagation model
provides more insights to end users and we plan to perform in-depth
study for the topic and provide simulation interface in the future.
4 CASE STUDY
4.1 Data Description and Preprocessing
We collect loan records spanning ten years from a major commercial
bank in China. The names of the customers in the records are
encrypted and replaced by an ID; we can access the basic profile
like the enterprise scale, the loan information like the guarantee ID
and loan credit. We first introduce the loan process, and then explain
how the information are extracted and cleaned.
The banks need to collect as much fine-grained information as
possible, concerning the repayment ability of the enterprise. The
information falls into four categories: transaction information, cus-
tomer information, asset information such as mortgage status, history
loan approval bank side record, etc. The most relevant to the loan
guarantees are eight data tables: customer profile, loan account in-
formation, repayment status, guarantee profile, customer credit, loan
contract, guarantee relationship, guarantee contract, default status.
There are often more than one guarantors for one loan transaction,
and there may be several loan transactions for a single guarantor in
a period. Once the loan is approved, the SMEs usually can obtain
the full size of loan immediately, and start to repay to the bank
regularly by an installment plan until the end of the loan contract. In
the record preprocess phase, by joining the nine tables, we obtain
records related to the corporation ID and loan contracts. We then
construct the guarantee network and compute the network related
measurements.
4.2 Guarantee Data Exploration
We now report the observations derived from the data. Overall
statistics There are 11,000 loan customers, which span 60,948 mu-
tual guarantee relationships derived from 36,618 loan contracts.
There are 5,911 defaults during the past ten years, out of the to-
tal 87,307 repayments. The overall default rate to the number of
contracts is 6.77%.
Centrality indicators are helpful to identify the relative importance
of nodes in the network. Fig. 13 gives the histogram of several most
complex subgraphs on how the defaults distributed with different
centrality indicator values. It is noted defaults happen more on nodes
with large authority value and small hub values. This is consistent
with intuition – the enterprise works as the hub ones back a large
number of other corporations and it is supposed to be relatively
stable and operates in good condition. In contrast, the enterprise
works as the authority ones and accepts guarantee from many other
corporations and this means they lack funds security and have higher
risk in trouble. The statistics indicate the lender to watch the status
of the “authority” high nodes in the guarantee network. Although the
underlying assumption of pagerank is quite alike authority score, we
did not observe similar correlation between the values and default
rates (see Fig. 13). It is observed that the larger the centrality the
higher default rates.
The tasks were as follows: (1) Visual Analytics for High Default
Groups; and (2) Visual Analytics for high default Pattern.
4.3 Visual Analytics for High Default Group
The first case study is to find high default groups. The random walk
community detection algorithm divides the guarantee network into
36 communities. The statistics are given in Table 1. We edit the
community following basic guidelines: (1) consider default status,
loan amount and other financial statistics comprehensively; (2) mall
communities can be either merged with its neighbouring large com-
munities or pruned. For example, community 35,34 both have 4
nodes and these firms never default. There is low possibility they
will become high default groups in the future; while the community
23 have 8 nodes and 3 of them have default history. They could
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Figure 13: Overdue rates for different graph matric values. From left to right, each column is for a kind of graph matric, namely Authority score,
Hub score, PageRank value, K-shell value, Eigenvector centrality, Betweenness centrality, Closeness centrality; From top to down, each row is the
most complex independent subgraphs.
Community ID 1 2 3 4 5 32 33 34 35
Firms 44 42 35 19 29 4 3 4 4
Defaults 14 6 3 5 5 1 1 0 0
Ratio for default firms 32% 14% 9% 26% 17% 25% 33% 0 0
Ratio for default amount 68% 37% 4% 92% 83% 72% 100% 0 0
Structural hole spanner 7 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 1
Neighbour communities 5 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 1
Total loan amount 1071 518 1503 292 1282 18 48 57 105
Total default amount 733 190 62 270 1065 13 48 0 0
Table 1: Statistics for communities generated by the random walk
community detection algorithm [45,49].
Community ID 1 2 3 6 7 8 9
Firms 46 36 103 44 88 25 128
Defaults 6 11 37 17 18 7 25
Ratio for default firms 13% 31% 36% 39% 20% 28% 20%
Ratio for default amount 31% 97% 85% 41% 40% 78% 51%
Structural hole spanner 4 1 17 3 7 1 5
Neighbour communities 2 1 6 1 2 1 2
Total loan amount 623 826 1695 2080 2273 512 4045
Total default amount 191 804 1441 863 918 398 2083
Table 2: Statistics for communities after interactive editing.
be merged with the neighbouring communities. (3) structural hole
spanner nodes should be paid special attention. Usually, there are
defaults happen on the structural hole spanners, the adjacent commu-
nities can be merged. Finally, we obtain ten communities and seven
of them has relative high default rates as Table 2. The seven medium
sized groups of subgraphs which can be efficiently processed for
further tasks. It is noted that the merge and reassign operation are
based on the user expertise. As the user may choose various crite-
ria, the final tree map can demonstrate different combinations and
default rates.
4.4 Visual Analytics for high default Pattern
In this subsection, we explore high default patterns beyond guar-
antee circles. It includes (1) automatic motif detection from
high default groups. Specifically, we employ the gtrieScanner
(http://www.dcc.fc.up.pt/gtries/) approach. (2) matching the mo-
tifs with the entire network and calculate the ratio for default firms.
(3) ranking the motifs in descending defaults order, and they are high
default patterns. (4) the user interactively edits the high default pat-
terns by adding more nodes, and the system will automatically match
the new subgraph with the entire network and produce the ratio for
default firms. Theoretically, There are 199 and 9,364 possibility
combinations for 4- and 5- vertex-motifs [33] for a directed network,
respectively. Matching all those motifs on the whole network would
be time-consuming. The user interactively editing motifs helps more
efficient to explore new patterns.
In practice, we choose to analyze community 3, which consists
of 103 enterprises; 36% of them default the 85% loans from the
bank, as Table 2 shows. Fig. 15 gives the twenty 4-vertex-motifs
automatic algorithm detected from community 3, and Table 3 shows
the statistical information.
Although there are nearly 200 kinds of 4 vertex node motif shapes,
there are only 20 existing in the high default group. We thus perform
analysis on the 20 motifs instead of every shape. The detailed motif
shapes are given in Fig. 15. Most of the them have rather complex
structures, however, some of them are known to banking experts,
for example, motif 6 is joint liability loan. Some others can be
understood by a combinations of smaller guarantee patterns. For
example, motif 5 is a combination of joint liability with a single
guarantee. Three of the motifs, motif 15, 16, and 17 attracted our
attention. (1) high default rates for the patterns (ranging from 61%
to 90% in ratio for default firm and 55% to 100% in Ratio for default
amount); (2) relative small number of instances (4 or 5) are detected
from the whole network. Besides, (3) the top five risk motifs show
single input, single output, feed forward structures.
Fig. 16 gives all the pattern 15 instances detected from the entire
network. Some of motif instances coincide together. These three
patterns are interesting, for example, pattern 15 recurrent for five
times in a group, the bank lost all the money lend to the enterprises
with such guarantee structures(see Table 3). There is high possibility
that fraud loan guarantee may happen for several times; and local
bank failed to recognize the fraud pattern. Similar analysis implies
pattern 16 and 17 may be also guarantee patterns with high default.
5 USER STUDY
We then conduct interviews with two banking loan experts. The
first one comes from the financial regulator. The expert has more
than five years of guarantee network research experience and has
published several important investigation reports and books on the
Chinese loan guarantee network status. The second one comes from
a major commercial bank credit department; who has ten years of
loan approval experience.
Both experts are attracted by and understand the visualization
guarantee relationships immediately. The first expert is rather inter-
Community 6 Community 3 Community 7Community 8 Community 9Community 13
Community 12
Figure 14: High default groups after interactive editing.
Motif ID 19 15 20 16 17 8 3 7 10 14 4 12 5 18 13 11 2 1 6 9
Motifs 1 4 1 4 4 74 169 92 23 6 164 17 151 1 13 22 312 437 95 24
Firms 4 10 4 28 18 165 238 179 125 24 202 101 304 25 106 138 410 522 478 176
default firms 4 9 3 18 11 79 110 69 48 9 70 35 89 7 28 32 95 111 79 26
Ratio for default firm 100 90 75 64 61 48 46 39 38 38 35 35 29 28 26 23 23 21 17 15
Ratio for default amount 100 100 100 55 75 56 53 71 45 47 59 37 58 24 31 49 64 49 46 44
Total loan amount 36 78 64 955 218 3259 5442 3583 3602 263 4872 3157 6975 1364 3134 4930 8919 11963 10546 3433
Total default amount 36 78 64 522 163 1829 2897 2547 1607 123 2871 1166 4072 331 970 2405 5686 5822 4836 1507
Table 3: Statistics information for the high default motifs.
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Figure 15: All the pattern (4-vertex-motif structures) detected from community 3. Among them, pattern 15,16 and 17 show single input, single
output, feed forward structures.
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Figure 16: (a) Highlight all pattern 15 on the loan guarantee network.
(b) Pattern 15 model. (c) Alternative way to understand the pattern 15
on the real network.
ested with the community editing. He said they try to resolve the
financial risks in guarantee network, a major operation is to split
the loan guarantee network into smaller ones with risks isolated.
In this case, health enterprises will not be affected by financially
risk enterprises. The editing function of our tool provides them a
powerful weapon to achieve their target. Besides, the expert also has
interest in the risk guarantee pattern discovery module, and he agrees
the significant value provided by the finding of such risk patterns.
There might exist illegally convey benefits under the suggested high
default patterns. The expert will also dive into the financial disclo-
sures of the risk guarantee enterprises and examine whether fraud
guarantees are happening. The second expert expressed that he has
never grasp the whole intercalations between enterprises so clear
when assessing a loan. The expert claims the tree map gives an
intuitive understanding about the guarantee groups.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present visual analytics approach for loan guarantee network
risk management in this paper. To our best knowledge, this is the
first work using visualization analysis approaches to address the
guarantee network default risk issue. We design and implement
interactive interface to analysis the individual enterprises default
risk, high default groups, patterns in the group, network evolution
and default diffusion path. The analysis can help the government and
bank monitoring default spread status and provides insight for taking
precautionary measures to prevent and dissolve systemic financial
risk. Future work will include computational modeling of default
diffusion and visual analytics for taking precautionary measures.
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